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Notes
THE DEVIL WEARS NADA:
HOW THE CURRENT STATUTORY DAMAGES SYSTEM
FOR COUNTERFEIT TRADEMARKS AS
DEMONSTRATED IN CHANEL, INC. v.
MATOS IS OUT OF STYLE
LAUREN MATTURRI*
“Luxury is inimitable, permanent.  It is essential . . . to preserve
the true, lasting value of what we create.”1
I. INTRODUCTION: EXPLAINING THE ISSUES OF COUNTERFEITING
TO ANNA WINTOUR
A person can have many valuable things, but counterfeit handbags
are not and will never be in style.2  The fashion industry is no newcomer
when it comes to dealing with the effects of counterfeit goods.3  Trade-
* J.D. Candidate, 2018, Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law;
B.A., 2014, Lafayette College.  I would like to thank my family and friends for their
support.  I would also like to thank the editors of the Villanova Law Review for their
assistance throughout the writing process.  This Note is dedicated to my late
grandfather, Judge Alexander J. Matturri.  The title and theme for this Note were
inspired by the movie The Devil Wears Prada and various other fashion nuances
from pop culture. See THE DEVIL WEARS PRADA (Fox 2000 Pictures 2006).
1. Kerry Pieri, Exclusive: Ebay and the CFDA’s “You Can’t Fake Fashion” Designer
Totes, HARPER’S BAZAAR (Mar. 12, 2013), http://www.harpersbazaar.com/fashion/
trends/g2599/ebay-cfda-you-cant-fake-fashion-designer-totes/ [https://perma.cc/
H5LY-7HXF] (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Gilles Mendel from J. Mendel).  Pieri’s interview with Mendel took place at the
launch party for the “You Can’t Fake Fashion” campaign, a joint effort between
eBay and the Council for Fashion Designers of America (CFDA) designed to take
on the issue of counterfeiting. See id. (describing “You Can’t Fake Fashion”
initiative).
2. See Sarah J. Kaufman, Note, Trend Forecast: Imitation Is a Legal Form of Flat-
tery—Louis Vuitton Malletier v. Dooney & Bourke, Inc., 23 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT.
L.J. 531, 532–33 (2005) (describing how knockoffs and counterfeits define differ-
ent aspects of trademark infringement).  A counterfeit item is a product in which a
trademark of a fashion house is illegally used to sell goods with that fashion
house’s marks, but the product is of significantly lesser quality and the trademark
is used without permission. See id. at 533 (citing Imitating Property Is Theft, ECONO-
MIST (May 15, 2003), http://www.economist.com/node/1780818 [https://perma
.cc/2H7M-GY36]) (defining counterfeiting); see also Counterfeit, BLACK’S LAW DIC-
TIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
3. See, e.g., Chavie Lieber, Why the $600 Billion Counterfeit Industry Is Still Horrible
for Fashion, RACKED (Dec. 1, 2014, 11:45 AM), http://www.racked.com/2014/12/
1/7566859/counterfeit-fashion-goods-products-museum-exhibit [https://perma
.cc/56ZF-KUWX] (highlighting that international counterfeit industry is not end-
(327)
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marked handbags, clothes, and other accessories are continuously coun-
terfeited and sold illicitly.4  The Internet has made this problem even
worse by providing counterfeiters with an expanded market and a greater
number of purchasers.5  Fashion designers regularly sue counterfeiters via
trademark infringement statutes and subsequently request statutory
damages.6
Section 1117 of the Lanham Act,7 titled “Recovery for Violation of
Rights,” gives courts wide discretion to award statutory damages in coun-
terfeiting cases, which has resulted in inconsistent approaches to calculat-
ing damages under the statute.8  Statutorily permitted judicial discretion
ing anytime soon but measures can be taken domestically to deter counterfeit mar-
ket).  Lieber’s article states that the issue of counterfeiting handbags, specifically,
began in the 1980s and was due to the consumer obsession with designer handbags
plastered with logos. See id. (explaining rise in popularity of counterfeit hand-
bags).  This increased demand for logo-branded handbags, and thus, a market for
logo-branded handbags costing less than their authentic counterparts was born.
See id. (describing creation of counterfeit handbag market).  A potential solution
to this fashion industry-wide problem could be starting with designers not copying
each other, which is what “fast” fashion companies such as Zara and H&M do. See
id. (suggesting solution to counterfeiting problem); see also Andrew Chung, Costco
Should Pay $5.5 Million for Selling Fake Tiffany Rings: U.S. Jury, REUTERS (Sept. 30,
2016, 11:51 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-tiffany-costco-wholesale-law-
suit-idUSKCN120245 [https://perma.cc/TG8E-G5JR] (describing lawsuit between
Tiffany and Costco).  Chung’s article discusses how Costco was selling engagement
rings under the Tiffany name that were not, in fact, Tiffany brand. See id. (describ-
ing litigation between Costco and Tiffany & Co. over sale of allegedly counterfeit
engagement rings).  Tiffany won a suit for infringement on their protected trade-
marks and damage brought on by consumer confusion. See id. (noting Tiffany &
Co. won counterfeit case against Costco).
4. See, e.g., Louis Vuitton Malletier & Oakley, Inc. v. Veit, 211 F. Supp. 2d 567,
584 (E.D. Pa. 2002), amended (E.D. Pa. June 28, 2002) (stating issue of counter-
feiting is “no longer . . . limited to the street vendor” in New York City but rather
all over Internet in many different forms).  The Internet allows counterfeiters to
expand their businesses and reach a larger market of potential buyers. See id.
(commenting on Internet’s impact on counterfeiters).
5. See id. (distinguishing unique role Internet plays in furthering profits and
businesses of counterfeiters).  Through the Internet, counterfeiters can sell illicit
goods on legitimate auction website like eBay or by registering domain names and
selling items through personal websites. See Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d
93, 97 (2d Cir. 2010) (discussing counterfeit Tiffany items sold on eBay.com); Cha-
nel, Inc. v. Gordashevsky, 558 F. Supp. 2d 532, 535 (D.N.J. 2008) (discussing coun-
terfeit goods sold on defendant’s website).
6. See generally Colleen Jordan Orscheln, Comment, Bad News Birkins: Counter-
feit in Luxury Brands, 14 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 249 (2015) (describing
various causes of action available to trademark owners and discussing several repre-
sentative cases).
7. See Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427 (1946) (codified at 15 U.S.C
§§ 1051–1141n (2012)).
8. See 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (permitting courts to use discretion).  Judicial discre-
tion has led to judges calculating damages inconsistently in similar counterfeit
trademark cases.  For a description of different approaches in similar counterfeit
cases, see generally Gucci Am., Inc. v. Gold Ctr. Jewelry, 158 F.3d 631 (2d Cir.
1998) (considering Copyright Act guidance when awarding statutory damages
equal to ten percent of defendant’s counterfeit business); Chanel, Inc. v. Matos,
2
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has made the statute ineffective in achieving its goals to compensate plain-
tiffs and deter counterfeiters.9
The counterfeiting industry is not shrinking anytime soon, and the
current statutory damages system is not helping.10  Alternative approaches
to handling trademark counterfeit cases need to be examined.11  While
monetary damages help compensate plaintiffs for potentially lost profits,
they are not deterring defendants and other counterfeiters from taking
part in the illicit market.12  Permanent injunctive relief legally stops de-
133 F. Supp. 3d 678 (D.N.J. 2015) (adopting copyright damages approach but con-
sidering other approaches); Coach, Inc. v. Ocean Point Gifts, Civil Action No.
CIV.A.09-4215(JBS), 2010 WL 2521444 (D.N.J. June 14, 2010) (adopting copyright
damages law); Veit, 211 F. Supp. 2d 567 (examining copyright law approach but
strongly considering defendant’s willful actions and point of sale).
9. See Antonio R. Sarabia II, Marked Recovery: The Calculation of Statutory Dam-
ages for Trademark Infringement Could Be Simplified by Using the “Class System” to Deter-
mine Goods and Services, L.A. LAW., Apr. 2005, at 36, 38–40 (describing
ineffectiveness of current damages analysis and instead proposing system for
awarding damages based on classes of counterfeited trademarks).  Sarabia’s article
argues a class system would address the issue of counterfeit goods by encouraging
trademark owners to register their marks sooner, thus allowing courts to target
their awards for damages. See id. at 40 (illustrating potential benefit of class sys-
tem).  Registering the mark would provide the added benefit of having the mark
fit into a class of use such as handbags or women’s shirts. See id. at 39 (explaining
benefit of registering provided by class system).  Each of these classes would then
have a specific range of damages that courts could award. See id. at 40 (acknowl-
edging another benefit of class system).
10. See Kevin V. Tu, Counterfeit Fashion: The Interplay Between Copyright and
Trademark Law in Original Fashion Designs and Designer Knockoffs, 18 TEX. INTELL.
PROP. L.J. 419, 423 (2010) (“At best, the protection extended to fashion designs
under United States law provides a spotty defense against counterfeit and knockoff
designs . . . .  In light of this limited scheme of protection, both copyright’s primary
function to ‘promote the [p]rogress of [s]cience and useful [a]rts’ and trade-
mark’s goal of protecting against unfair competition accentuate the need for a
more comprehensive plan of protecting fashion and apparel designs.” (alteration
in original) (footnotes omitted)).  Tu’s article promotes the idea that the various
intellectual property laws should not be so separate when it comes to the fashion
industry and that using a combination of some or all of those laws might be the
best approach to stopping counterfeiting. See id. at 420 (suggesting way of address-
ing counterfeiting problem).
11. See Sarabia, supra note 9, at 39–40 (outlining problems with existing statu-
tory damages scheme and arguing instead for class system approach to counterfeit
damages); Tu, supra note 10, at 422–23, 425 (stating failures of current system and
arguing for copyright law and trademark law to work in conjunction to provide
best protections to all fashion designers).
12. See Orscheln, supra note 6, at 257–58 (noting plaintiffs can also recover
injunctive relief but that injunctive relief does not promote deterrence).  This is
because injunctions are granted after counterfeiters have already been selling the
goods on the market. See id. (explaining why injunctive relief is not sufficient de-
terrent for counterfeiters).  Actions need to be taken to stop counterfeiting before
fashion houses conduct investigations that turn up evidence of counterfeiting. See
id. at 257, 266 (stressing importance of taking action to deter counterfeiting). See
infra notes 100–01 and accompanying text (discussing Orscheln’s approach to de-
terring counterfeit industry).
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fendants from being able to use the mark; it does not stop counterfeiters
before they sell the goods.13
Chanel, Inc. v. Matos14 is one case in a long line of cases showing that
the current statutory damages system is out of style.15  The court in Matos
adopted an approach similar to that taken in cases for copyright damages,
but it acknowledged other approaches that courts have taken.16  This ac-
knowledgment shows that, even with a significant amount of case law and
numerous approaches available, courts are still unsure of how to calculate
statutory damages.
Matos addresses some of the major issues found in counterfeit trade-
mark cases.17  In that case, the plaintiff, Chanel, an internationally famous
fashion house, brought suit against the owner of a website who was selling
counterfeit goods bearing Chanel marks.18  The plaintiff was able to re-
cover statutory damages under Section § 1117 of the Lanham Act.19  Us-
ing its discretion, the District of New Jersey awarded the plaintiff statutory
damages.20
This Note argues that the current damages system under § 1117 of
the Lanham Act, as demonstrated in Matos, gives courts too-wide of discre-
tion when calculating damages.  This results in inconsistent calculations of
damages for similar counterfeit trademark cases, and thus disserves the
public’s interest in effectively deterring counterfeiters and compensating
13. See supra note 12 and accompanying text (explaining limitations inherent
to injunctive relief).
14. 133 F. Supp. 3d 678 (D.N.J. 2015).
15. See id. at 688–90 (awarding statutory damages by weighing copyright law
factors and acknowledging statutory damages should have some relation to actual
damages).  The court followed the copyright approaches taken in other cases. See
Coach, Inc. v. Ocean Point Gifts, Civil Action No. CIV.A.09-4215(JBS), 2010 WL
2521444, at *1–2 (D.N.J. June 14, 2010) (awarding statutory damages according to
copyright law approach); Louis Vuitton Malletier & Oakley, Inc. v. Veit, 211 F.
Supp. 2d 567, 583–84 (E.D. Pa. 2002), amended (E.D. Pa. June 28, 2002) (analyz-
ing statutory damages under Copyright Act framework and proceeding with dam-
ages award under statutory framework); see also Gucci Am., Inc. v. Gold Ctr.
Jewelry, 158 F.3d 631 (2d Cir. 1998) (considering Copyright Act guidance when
awarding statutory damages equal to ten percent of defendant’s counterfeit
business).
16. See Matos, 133 F. Supp. 3d at 685 (acknowledging that statutory damages
should have some relation to estimated actual damages).
17. See infra notes 124–44 and accompanying text for a discussion of the is-
sues addressed in Matos and how the court dealt with them.
18. See Matos, 133 F. Supp. 3d. at 682–83 (stating defendant did not have per-
mission from plaintiff to sell goods with Chanel marks on them).
19. See id. at 689 (awarding damages based on §  1117); see also 15 U.S.C.
§ 1117 (2012) (providing range of monetary damages courts must use when deter-
mining damages to award); see also infra notes 102–03 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing copyright-adopted law).
20. See Matos, 133 F. Supp. 3d at 687 (awarding $180,000 in statutory damages
and $400 for cost of suit).
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plaintiffs.21  Therefore, alternative approaches to awarding statutory dam-
ages in such cases should be examined.22  Part II of this Note provides
background information necessary to understand the counterfeiting issue
by examining relevant statutes, cases, and proposed alternative ap-
proaches.23  Part III provides the facts of the case central to this Note,
Matos.24  Part IV discusses the Matos court’s reasoning behind the calcula-
tion of the statutory damages it awarded.25  Part V offers a critical analysis
of the court’s reasoning in Matos.26  Part VI of this Note concludes by dem-
onstrating that Matos is one case in a long line of cases awarding inconsis-
tent damages for counterfeiting and urges the legislature to examine
alternative approaches.27
II. HOW THE COUNTERFEITING INDUSTRY CAME TO BE
AS PREVALENT AS SKINNY JEANS
Courts addressing counterfeit trademark issues are calculating statu-
tory damages in very different ways.28  To understand why, it is necessary
to start with an explanation of the statutes enacted to stop counterfeiting
activity and protect trademark holders.29  This Section will discuss how
courts have recently approached the statutory discretion inherent in
§ 1117.30  Then, this Section will examine approaches courts have taken to
understand the greater role counterfeit goods play in intellectual property
21. See infra notes 148–71 and accompanying text (discussing why current stat-
utory damages system is not effective and how Matos tries, but fails, to add teeth to
system).
22. See infra notes 159–71 and accompanying text (discussing proposed alter-
native approaches to counterfeiting).
23. See infra notes 28–111 and accompanying text (explaining background of
issue).
24. See infra notes 112–23 and accompanying text (describing facts of Matos).
25. See infra notes 124–44 and accompanying text (providing narrative analy-
sis of Matos).
26. See infra notes 145–71 and accompanying text (discussing critical analysis
of Matos).
27. See infra notes 172–86 and accompanying text (explaining impact case will
have on counterfeit industry and proposing alternative approaches to serve trade-
mark holders better and deter counterfeit industry).
28. See, e.g., Coach, Inc. v. Ocean Point Gifts, Civil Action No. CIV.A.09-4215
(JBS), 2010 WL 2521444, at *6 (D.N.J. June 14, 2010) (adopting copyright dam-
ages law); Chanel, Inc. v. Gordashevsky, 558 F. Supp. 2d 532, 537–38 (D.N.J. 2008)
(using actual damages to determine statutory damages); Louis Vuitton Malletier &
Oakley, Inc. v. Veit, 211 F. Supp. 2d 567, 583–85 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (examining copy-
right damage approach but strongly considering defendant’s willful actions and
point of sale).
29. See infra notes 33–51 and accompanying text (explaining statutes enacted
to address counterfeiting).
30. See infra notes 52–71 and accompanying text (showing approaches taken
by various courts to calculate statutory damages award).
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law.31  Finally, this section concludes with a discussion of proposed alter-
native approaches to dealing with counterfeit trademark cases.32
A. Why That Counterfeit Chanel Was Not Worth It: The Current State of
Counterfeit Goods in the Fashion Industry
The fashion industry is a multibillion-dollar industry with very few ef-
fective intellectual property protections.33  Counterfeiting is one of the
major intellectual property issues affecting the fashion industry, the world
economy, and criminal organizations.34  This global issue is even more
prevalent because of the Internet’s expanding role in it.35  U.S. law aims to
take down this illicit industry with laws that deter counterfeit goods and
strengthen the rights of trademark holders.36
The fashion industry, however, has struggled to apply different intel-
lectual property laws to the issue of counterfeiting.37  Current intellectual
property laws do not provide adequate solutions for protecting marks in
31. See infra notes 73–96 and accompanying text (describing trademark case
law as relevant to issue of counterfeiting).
32. See infra notes 97–111 and accompanying text (discussing alternative
approaches).
33. See Tu, supra note 10, at 425 (arguing action must be taken to deter coun-
terfeiting and stop illicit industry).
34. See Orscheln, supra note 6, at 259–60 (noting counterfeiting has signifi-
cant impact on employment in United States).  Because of the illicit nature of the
counterfeit industry, counterfeiters do not keep books or keep track of their sales.
See Sarabia, supra note 9, at 37 (explaining how business records relating to coun-
terfeiting activity typically do not exist in such cases).  Therefore, it is hard to de-
termine the actual monetary effect counterfeit goods have on the fashion industry.
See Orscheln, supra note 6, at 257 (showing full impact of illicit industry is
unknown).
35. See id. at 261 (noting that Internet has expanded counterfeiters’ reaches).
36. See H.R. REP. NO. 110-617, at 24–25 (2008) (highlighting purposes of stat-
ute and why amendments were needed to further statute’s goals of deterrence and
compensating trademark holders).  It was necessary to raise the statutory range
dollar amount to further the public interest of deterrence. See infra note 47 and
accompanying text (discussing how statutory damages are calculated).
37. See Kaufman, supra note 2, at 565–66 (showing difficulty of applying trade-
mark and copyright law to fashion industry because one cannot file suit against
starting trend).  This issue was central to Louis Vuitton Malletier v. Dooney & Bourke,
Inc., in which Louis Vuitton sued Dooney & Bourke for copyright infringement
because of a line of handbags Dooney & Bourke released that was very similar to a
collection Louis Vuitton had released in a prior season. See Louis Vuitton Malletier
v. Dooney & Bourke, Inc., 454 F.3d 108, 109 (2d Cir. 2006) (discussing plaintiff’s
claims).  The Second Circuit held that the plaintiff did not hold the rights to that
specific bag design—a white background with a multicolor logo—and that a de-
signer cannot copyright a trend. See id. at 112 (providing holding of case).
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this industry.38  Some argue legislation should target purchasers, not just
sellers of counterfeit goods.39
Trademark protections stem from various sections of the Lanham
Act, which aims to protect the rights of trademark holders.40  Section 1125
of the Lanham Act gives a registered trademark owner a right of civil ac-
tion if a party infringes his or her trademark.41  This statute can be applied
to the fashion industry as a means to give fashion houses the ability to sue
for trademark infringement and counterfeiting.42
In 1996, Congress passed § 1117 of the Lanham Act, allowing trade-
mark holders a right of civil action against a specific type of trademark
infringer: the counterfeiter.43  This statute’s goal is to deter such illegal
activity and compensate plaintiffs for lost profits, goodwill, and integrity as
a result of the infringement.44
Under § 1117, courts have wide discretion to award damages, attor-
ney’s fees, and costs.45  Per this statute, a plaintiff has the option to re-
quest statutory damages over actual damages if actual damages would be
38. See generally Kaufman, supra note 2, at 565–66 (describing problems with
applying different areas of intellectual property to fashion industry and
counterfeits).
39. See, e.g., Orscheln, supra note 6, at 263–65 (emphasizing counterfeiting is
international problem and measures should be taken to pursue all players in-
volved, including purchasers).
40. See 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (2012) (noting statute provides fashion houses and
designers with different remedies, including statutory damages); see also 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125 (2012) (providing civil action against infringement); 15 U.S.C. § 1114
(2012) (permitting injunctive relief in counterfeit cases).
41. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (allowing trademark owners, registered or not,
right of civil action if their trademark is used without their permission).
42. See Tu, supra note 10, at 431–32 (explaining how statutes provide right to
sue in effort to allow trademark owners to protect their exclusive rights).  The
implementation of these trademark protection statutes shows that the government
is taking action to address trademark infringement and counterfeiting with the
ultimate goal of stopping counterfeiters. See id. at 432 (explaining indirect protec-
tions sometimes available to designers).
43. See Anticounterfeiting Consumer Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
153, 110 Stat. 1386 (allowing owners of registered trademarks ability to seek vari-
ous remedies for civil suits brought against infringers and counterfeiters).
44. See S. REP. NO. 104-177, at 1–6 (1995) (highlighting problem of counter-
feiting and stating that purpose of statute is to compensate plaintiffs and deter
counterfeiters).
45. See Louis Vuitton Malletier & Oakley Inc. v. Veit, 211 F. Supp. 2d 567, 583
(E.D. Pa. 2002) (“In the absence of clear guidelines for setting a statutory damage
award, courts have tended to use their wide discretion to compensate plaintiffs, as
well as to deter and punish defendants . . . .”), amended (E.D. Pa. June 28, 2002).
Statutory damages are calculated within a range of one thousand to one million
dollars per infringing act when willfulness of the defendant is not taken into ac-
count. See 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c)(1) (outlining calculation of statutory damages for
use of counterfeit marks).  When the defendant’s actions are willful, the statutory
range maximum increases to $2 million per infringing act. See id. at § 1117(c)(2)
(explaining calculation of statutory damages if court finds use of counterfeit mark
was willful); see also infra note 48 and accompanying text (discussing willfulness
criteria).
7
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too challenging to prove.46  Section 1117 gives courts wide discretion to
award statutory damages in the range of $1,000–$200,000 per infringing
act.47  The statutory maximum increases to $2 million if the court deter-
mines the counterfeiter’s actions were willful.48  Courts often look to
other analogous intellectual property laws such as copyright law, patent
law, and prior court rulings regarding various intellectual property in-
fringement damages for guidance.49
In addition to the statute permitting statutory damages, a plaintiff can
request attorney’s fees and costs in “exceptional cases.”50  Section 1114 of
46. See 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c) (permitting plaintiff to request statutory damages
over actual damages).
47. See id. (stating statutory damages range and noting that act of infringe-
ment is made up of each trademark violated multiplied by number of goods or
services on which mark was used).  If a defendant sells three types of purses, each
of which uses two different trademarks on each handbag, then the defendant has
committed six infringing acts. See id.  The statutory range would apply to each
specific act of infringement.
 In the original 1996 Act, the statutory range used was $500 to $100,000 per
infringing act, and if a defendant acted willfully, this range increased to a maxi-
mum of $1 million. See Pub. L. No. 104-153, § 7, 110 Stat. at 1388.  In 2008, Con-
gress increased the range to further the goal of deterrence in an industry that is
not slowing down: “In the ensuing 12 years, the profits of counterfeiters and the
volume of their traffic [have] skyrocketed.  The existing statutory damage levels no
longer serve as an adequate deterrent in this more lucrative environment.  There-
fore, the Act doubles current statutory damages for use of a counterfeit mark . . . .”
H.R. REP. NO. 110-617, at 25 (2008); see also Prioritizing Resources and Organiza-
tion for Intellectual Property Act of 2008, H.R. 4279, 110th Cong. §§ 104–05
(2008).  This Note references cases from before the range was amended, and such
discussions of those cases will reference the pre-2008 statutory range.
48. See 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c)(2) (outlining calculation of statutory damages for
use of counterfeit marks when actions were willful).  “Willful” is not defined in the
statute, leaving it up to the courts to decide what it means:
The statute is clear that in order to award the maximum $1 million
award, the defendants must have engaged in willful conduct, which en-
tails “an aura of indifference to plaintiff’s rights” or a “deliberate and
unnecessary duplicating of a plaintiff’s mark . . . in a way that was calcu-
lated to appropriate or otherwise benefit from the good will the plaintiff
had nurtured.”
Veit, 211 F. Supp. 2d at 583 (alteration in original) (quoting SecuraComm Consult-
ing Inc. v. Securacom Inc., 166 F.3d 182, 187 (3d Cir.1999)).
49. See, e.g., Sara Lee Corp. v. Bags of N.Y., Inc., 36 F. Supp. 2d 161, 166–67
(S.D.N.Y. 1999) (comparing trademark and copyright statutes and examining
prior court opinions to determine approach).
50. See 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (“The court in exceptional cases may award rea-
sonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.”).  The court in Chanel, Inc. v.
Gordashevsky defined exceptional cases as “includ[ing] those where the Court has
made a finding of willfulness.” See Chanel, Inc. v. Gordashevsky, 558 F. Supp. 2d
532, 539 (D.N.J. 2008) (defining “exceptional cases” (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a);
Securacomm Consulting, Inc. v. Securacom Inc., 224 F.3d 273, 280 (3d Cir.
2000))); see also infra notes 55, 69, and 134 (discussing exceptional circumstances).
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the Lanham Act also allows owners of counterfeited marks to request in-
junctive relief if the court deems it appropriate.51
B. The Latest Fashion Trends Concerning Counterfeit Goods and
Inconsistently-Calculated Statutory Damages
Generally, counterfeit trademark cases have common themes that
highlight the problems resulting from the statutory damages system.52
Such cases are presented to further the point that the current statutory
system’s goals of deterrence and compensating plaintiffs are not being ful-
filled.53  Plaintiffs in trademark infringement cases often elect an award of
statutory damages over actual damages because all defendants’ actions are
willful, so the statutory damages range maximum always increases.54  This
makes the willful criteria increase built into the statute obsolete.55  Injunc-
51. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114(2) (2012) (allowing injunctive relief in several differ-
ent instances of infringement).  Often counterfeit trademark cases end in default
judgment, which makes it appear that defendants do not seem to care about pend-
ing litigation or feel the need to defend their illegal actions. See infra note 57 and
accompanying text (showing counterfeit cases that end in default judgment).  By
primarily ending in default judgment, even with all the ways for trademark holders
to recover, counterfeiters are still not being deterred. See Gucci Am., Inc. v. Gold
Ctr. Jewelry, 158 F.3d 631, 635 (2d Cir. 1998) (explaining that defendant contin-
ued to counterfeit after being sued).  While fashion house plaintiffs can bring at-
tention to the public by educating purchasers about this global problem,
defendants are still not being held accountable for their actions. See Andrea Fel-
sted, Fashion Fights Back Against Counterfeiting, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 28, 2014), http://
www.ft.com/cms/s/0/4ca2d6c4-749d-11e4-b30b-00144feabdc0.html [https://per
ma.cc/D5BY-H6CP] (discussing measures designers take to educate public about
harms of counterfeiting).  Injunctive relief is also an important deterrence because
it legally stops defendant counterfeiters from using the marks in the future. See,
e.g., eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 392 (2006) (discussing issu-
ance of injunction to prevent party from utilizing another’s intellectual property).
52. See infra notes 54–73 and accompanying text (discussing common themes
underpinning counterfeit cases and resulting award of statutory damages).
53. See 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (providing recovery for violation of trademark law);
see also H.R. REP. NO. 110-617 (2008) (stating one of statute’s goals “is to improve
intellectual property enforcement in the United States and abroad”).
54. See 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c) (authorizing plaintiffs to recover statutory dam-
ages instead of actual damages).  There are various examples of cases where plain-
tiffs were awarded statutory damages. See generally Coach, Inc. v. Ocean Point Gifts,
Civil Action No. 09-4215 (JBS), 2010 WL 2521444, at *7–8 (D.N.J. June 14, 2010);
Chanel, Inc. v. Gordashevsky, 558 F. Supp. 2d 532, 583 (D.N.J. 2008) (acknowledg-
ing plaintiff requested actual damages and court subsequently awarded statutory
damages instead of amount plaintiff requested as actual damages); Louis Vuitton
Malletier & Oakley, Inc. v. Veit, 211 F. Supp. 2d 567, 583–84 (E.D. Pa. 2002)
(awarding statutory damages), amended (E.D. Pa. June 28, 2002).
55. See 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (authorizing trademark owners to recover attor-
ney fees and other costs).  This is because virtually every counterfeit case meets the
“exceptional circumstances” criteria of defendants acting with knowledge they
were producing or selling counterfeit goods. See Ocean Point Gifts, 2010 WL
2521444, at *7–8 (noting plaintiffs requested and were awarded attorney’s fees and
costs); Gordashevsky, 558 F. Supp. 2d at 583 (noting dispute surrounded award of
attorney’s fees and costs of investigation).
9
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tive relief is granted and often ignored, which is evident because most
defendants continue to sell or take part in the illicit industry in less blatant
capacities.56  Additionally, most counterfeit cases end in default judgment
because properly served defendants choose to ignore the pending
judgment.57
Trademark law as a type of intellectual property is meant to lessen
consumer confusion between goods and services by protecting marks.58
Consumer confusion is one of the driving forces behind ending the sale of
counterfeit goods, which hurts the goodwill and integrity of a designer’s
trademark.59  In Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Electronics Corp.,60 the Second Cir-
cuit determined that a plaintiff cannot sit on its rights as a trademark
holder and delay bringing an infringement suit.61  If trademark holders
are aware of another product using that mark or a similar one, they need
56. See Guess?, Inc. v. Gold Ctr. Jewelry, 997 F. Supp. 409, 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)
(holding plaintiff was awarded $4500 in statutory damages and $3,500 in attorney’s
fees), aff’d, Gucci Am., Inc. v. Gold Ctr. Jewelry, 158 F.3d 631 (2d Cir. 1998).  This
case was a counterfeit trademark action brought against the owner of a jewelry
store selling goods bearing the plaintiff’s marks without the plaintiff’s permission.
See id. at 410 (stating plaintiff “willfully sold counterfeit ‘Guess?’ items”).
57. See Gucci Am., Inc., 158 F.3d at 634 (emphasizing frequent role default
judgment plays in counterfeit trademark cases); Gordashevsky, 558 F. Supp. 2d at
535 (noting default judgment was proper).  The defendant in Gordashevsky ignored
the court’s judgment and continued to counterfeit. See id. at 635.
58. See Tu, supra note 10, at 428–30, 440 (citing Adidas-Salomon AG v. Target
Corp., No. CV-01-1582-ST, 2002 WL 31971831, at *7 (D. Or. July 31, 2002)) (ac-
knowledging root of trademark law, which is to prevent “buyer’s likely confusion
between two products”).  Counterfeit goods not only lead to consumer confusion
but mark dilution, as well, because they can tarnish the goodwill of the marks in
question. See infra note 59 (discussing mark dilution).  The history of statutory
damages being added to the Lanham Act can be traced back to the purpose of
intellectual property laws in general: to protect ideas and creations. See H.R. REP.
NO. 110-617, at 23 (discussing enhancement of protections for property rights
holders).
59. See Jed Wakefield & Phillip Haack, The Still Blurry Standards for Proving
Trademark Dilution, FENWICK & WEST LLP, https://www.fenwick.com/FenwickDocu
ments/Blurry_Trademark_Dilution.pdf [https://perma.cc/H6ME-TGGE] (ex-
plaining mark dilution).  Mark dilution occurs when a mark becomes so common
and is seen so often that it actually deters potential consumers from wanting to
purchase goods bearing the mark because these consumers previously associated
that mark with rarity and exclusiveness. See id. at 1 (explaining mark dilution).  It
also occurs when a mark becomes associated with a lower-quality product due to
counterfeiting. See id.  This dilution then drives potential purchasers to look for
alternative designers whose marks are not as common. See id. (showing dilution
presents serious problem for fashion designers).  Mark dilution has the effect of
hurting the integrity of the mark in question and profits from a loss in the cus-
tomer base. See Reuters, Beneath Louis Vuitton’s Distaste for Jokes, a Serious First
Amendment Question, FASHION L. (Aug. 29, 2016), http://www.thefashionlaw.com/
home/beneath-louis-vuittons-distaste-for-jokes-a-serious-first-amendment-question
[https://perma.cc/EGS5-NU7K] (explaining difficulty in courts addressing mark
dilution problems in application to fashion industry).
60. 287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1961).
61. See id. at 497–84 (holding court can time bar recovery in trademark in-
fringement cases).  In this case, the plaintiff waited eleven years to file suit even
10
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to bring suit within a reasonable amount of time.62  Additionally, in In-
terpace Corp. v. Lapp, Inc.,63 the Third Circuit created a list of factors known
as the “LAPP Test” to determine if product confusion exists between simi-
lar marks.64  These factors include the strength of the trademark whose
owner is bringing suit, similarity of the marks, competitiveness of the prod-
ucts, evidence of actual consumer confusion, and quality of the
products.65
The Third Circuit expanded the concept of consumer confusion in
Fisons Horticulture, Inc. v. Vigoro Industries, Inc.,66 by holding that, once a
court has established confusion is present, a trademark holder is entitled
to injunctive relief.67  The Supreme Court furthered this notion in eBay
Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.,68 a patent infringement case, where the Court
held injunctive relief was proper unless exceptional circumstances were
present.69  As another form of intellectual property, patent law, in many
regards, can be analogously adapted to trademark infringement and coun-
though it knew about the defendant’s use of the mark during that extended time
period. See id. at 493–94 (explaining relevant timeliness concerns).
62. See id. at 494 (noting plaintiff waited too long to file suit and defendant’s
use of mark was too far removed from trademark owner’s primary use of mark).
63. 721 F.2d 460, 464 (3d Cir. 1983).
64. See id. at 464 (holding defendant did infringe on plaintiff’s trademark be-
cause likelihood of confusion was present between both parties’ goods and provid-
ing factors to determine existence of product confusion).
65. See id. at 462 (noting “LAPP” developed Third Circuit trademark con-
sumer confusion factors).  These factors include:
(1) the degree of similarity between the owner’s mark and the alleged
infringing mark; (2) the strength of the owner’s mark; (3) the price of
the goods and other factors indicative of the care and attention expected
of consumers when making a purchase . . . (6) the evidence of actual
confusion; (7) whether the goods, though not competing, are marketed
through the same channels of trade and advertised through the same
media; (8) the extent to which the targets of the parties’ sales efforts are
the same; (9) the relationship of the goods in the minds of consumers
because of the similarity of function . . . .
Id. (citing Scott Paper Co. v. Scott’s Liquid Gold, Inc., 589 F.2d 1225, 1229 (3d Cir.
1978)) (providing LAPP factors).
66. 30 F.3d 466 (3d Cir. 1994).
67. See id. at 476 (furthering trademark rights by allowing trademark holders
to seek injunctive relief against invalid users).  This case is an example of courts
expanding and protecting trademark rights by taking steps to further deter coun-
terfeiters by expanding the LAPP Test to apply to goods using the same or similar
trademarks in the same market. See id. at 474 (discussing extension of LAPP Test).
68. 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
69. See id. at 393 (noting this patent infringement case can be viewed as analo-
gous to trademark holders suing over trademark infringement and counterfeit-
ing).  Exceptional circumstances are those that would go against the public
interest, such as selling illicit goods. See id. at 394 (defining “exceptional circum-
stances”); see also Sara Lee Corp. v. Bags of N.Y., Inc., 36 F. Supp. 2d 161, 167
(S.D.N.Y. 1999) (discussing court’s need to look to copyright infringement dam-
ages law for guidance with trademark infringement law because of large similari-
ties between areas of law).  This is another example of courts seeking guidance on
applying statutory damages by looking to other areas of intellectual property for
11
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terfeit cases.70  Injunctive relief aids plaintiffs by stopping a defendant
from using a trademark that is affecting the goodwill and integrity of said
mark in a way monetary damages cannot.71  Additionally, in eBay Inc., the
Supreme Court upheld a four-factor test to determine if injunctive relief is
a proper legal remedy for such patent infringement cases.72
C. When Vogue Is Not Sure Which Trend to Highlight: Different Ways Courts
Use Their Discretion to Award Statutory Damages
Since § 1117 was enacted in the early 1990s, courts have been unsure
as to how to calculate statutory damages.73  In Guess?, Inc. v. Gold Center
Jewelry,74 the possibility of actual damages of the counterfeit business heav-
ily influenced the Southern District of New York in determining an
amount to award.75  The court awarded $4,500 in statutory damages and
help. See id. (explaining courts’ use of other areas of intellectual property law to
determine statutory damages).
70. See MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. at 394 (noting overlapping nature of
various types of intellectual property when seeking damages for violation of per-
son’s intellectual property rights); see also Tu, supra note 10, at 428–30 (explaining
need to apply more than one type of intellectual property to fashion industry).
71. See infra note 72 and accompanying text (discussing injunctive relief).
72. See MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. at 392 (discussing requirements for in-
junctive relief).  A plaintiff must prove:
(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available
at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that
injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the plain-
tiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the pub-
lic interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.
Id. at 391 (citing Amoco Prod. Co. v. Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 542 (1987); Wein-
berger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 311–13 (1982)).  It is important to note
that various aspects of the different intellectual property areas and laws all look to
each other for guidance and answers. See Tu, supra note 10, at 428–30.  This crite-
rion for injunctive relief has been adopted in trademark infringement and coun-
terfeit cases. See e.g., Chanel, Inc. v. Matos, 133 F. Supp. 3d 678, 689–90 (D.N.J.
2015) (adopting injunctive relief criterion).  Injunctive relief is one of the com-
mon themes seen in counterfeit cases and is a necessary tool to use in all intellec-
tual property cases to deter violators and protect intellectual property holder
rights regardless of whether it is a patent or copyright matter. See MercExchange,
L.L.P., 547 U.S. at 393 (finding injunctive relief to be one of most common themes
in counterfeit cases).
73. See, e.g., Coach, Inc. v. Ocean Point Gifts, Civil Action No. 09-4215(JBS),
2010 WL 2521444, at *6 (D.N.J. June 14, 2010) (adding that court adopted copy-
right damages law to determine statutory damages); Guess?, Inc. v. Gold Ctr. Jew-
elry, 997 F. Supp. 409, 411 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (noting that court examined estimated
yearly profits of defendant’s business to calculate statutory damages award).
74. 997 F. Supp. 409 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
75. See id. at 412 (noting that court increased statutory maximum due to will-
ful actions of defendant).  It is important to note that the court did not discuss
awarding injunctive relief against the defendant. See generally id. (failing to discuss
award of injunctive relief).
12
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$3,500 in attorney’s fees.76  To reach the amounts that fell within the in-
creased-for-willfulness statutory range, the court looked at the estimated
yearly profits of the counterfeit business and awarded about ten percent of
that estimate.77
In Chanel, Inc. v. Gordashevsky,78 the District of New Jersey based the
amount of statutory damages awarded off the plaintiff’s estimated actual
profits of the counterfeit business.79  This damages approach acknowl-
edged the defendant acted willfully in counterfeiting the plaintiff’s
marks.80  However, this approach did not involve the court determining its
own amount of statutory damages to award, but rather considering the
plaintiff’s estimations and awarding the full amount the plaintiff asked for
as statutory damages.81  The court refused to call the awarded damages
actual damages even though they were based on estimated profits of the
counterfeit business.82  The defendant’s website even acknowledged it
sold only replicas, which did not help negate the defendant’s willful ac-
tions because it showed the defendant had knowledge of the marks and
knew they were not the defendant’s to use.83
76. See id. at 411–12 (highlighting statute permits courts to award attorney’s
fees and cost of suit in addition to monetary damages per infringing act under
§ 1117).
77. See id. at 412 (noting “willful” statutory maximum increase was present
because defendant continued to sell counterfeit goods bearing plaintiff’s trade-
marks even after told to stop).  Because this case was adjudicated before the 2008
amendments, the statutory range at issue is different than those of cases decided
after 2008. See Prioritizing Resources and Organization for Intellectual Property
Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–403, 122 Stat. 4256.  The Guess? court’s approach in
looking at estimated yearly profits could lead to unreliable calculations and awards
because a counterfeiter could provide faulty records that estimate the business to
be worth substantially less than it actually is. See Guess?, Inc., 997 F. Supp. at
411–12; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (2012) (noting statutory damages were added to
provide plaintiffs with ability to recover when actual records were unreliable or
unavailable).
78. 558 F. Supp. 2d 532 (D.N.J. 2008).
79. See id. at 537–38 (holding defendant’s willful conduct led court to award
statutory damages of $2,238,624.50).  In Gordashevsky, the plaintiff filed suit against
various defendants for selling counterfeit Chanel goods on different websites
owned by the defendants with the sole purpose of selling various counterfeit
goods. See id. at 535 (describing nature of suit).
80. See id. at 537 (emphasizing unique approach court took in significantly
relating statutory damages to actual damages).
81. See id. at 538–39 (adding plaintiff was entitled to recover attorney’s fees
and charges for investigating defendant’s business as part of reasonable, routine
business practice); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (specifying what plaintiff may re-
cover from defendant).
82. See Gordashevsky, 558 F. Supp. at 538 (highlighting unique approach taken
by court).  The court also stated that such wide discretion can lead to varied calcu-
lations of damages. See id. at 539 (explaining impact of wide discretion on calcula-
tion of damages).
83. See id. (noting that replica shows admission of knowledge that what was
being sold was not true, authentic good).
13
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While the Gold Center Jewelry and Gordashevsky courts awarded damages
based on estimated actual damages, the Southern District of New York in
Sara Lee Corp. v. Bags of New York, Inc.84 evaluated what other courts in the
Second Circuit had done in similar cases, which included looking to other
areas of intellectual property.85  First, the court acknowledged that the
statute provided wide discretion, which left the onus on courts to look for
guidance elsewhere in determining the proper calculation.86  Second, the
court looked at copyright infringement damages factors as an analogous
area of intellectual property law to adopt.87  Balancing these adopted cop-
yright damages factors led the court to award statutory damages and attor-
ney’s fees by heavily concentrating on the defendant’s conduct and public
interest of deterrence.88
While the Sara Lee court did not address the willful maximum in-
crease criteria, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania did so in Louis Vuitton
84. 36 F. Supp. 2d 161 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
85. See id. at 170–71 (awarding plaintiff $750,000 in statutory damages and
$46,045.63 in attorney’s fees and costs).  The plaintiff brought suit against the de-
fendant for selling counterfeit COACH handbags at its physical boardwalk store
and continuing to do so after the defendant was repeatedly asked to stop. See id. at
164 (describing defendant’s continued selling of counterfeit goods).
86. See id. at 165, 169 (noting court was unsure how to determine statutory
damages in early era in which law was enacted only recently).
87. See id. at 166–68 (noting court had to look to other courts and areas of
intellectual property for guidance).  This relates to the overlapping nature of intel-
lectual property and how approaches for combating the counterfeit industry, for
example, would best be served by combining different areas of intellectual prop-
erty law and not using solely trademark protections. See Tu, supra note 10, at
431–32 (providing that confronting counterfeiting would best be accomplished
through combination of areas of intellectual property law).  The Sara Lee court
looked to the Second Circuit’s opinion in Fitzgerald Publishing Co., Inc. v. Baylor
Publishing Co., Inc.’s statutory damage factors, which included:
the expenses saved and the profits reaped by the infringers are consid-
ered.  Other factors—not dependent on a particular defendant’s culpa-
bility—are also examined, including the revenues lost by the plaintiff, the
value of the copyright, and the deterrent effect on others . . . .  Some
factors do focus upon an individual defendant’s culpability, for instance,
whether the defendant’s conduct was innocent or willful, or whether a
defendant has cooperated in providing particular records from which to
assess the value of the infringing materials produced.  Finally, the poten-
tial for discouraging the defendant is factored into the determination of
the award.
Fitzgerald Pub. Co., Inc. v. Baylor Pub Co., Inc., 807 F.2d 1110, 1117 (2d Cir. 1986)
(citations omitted) (citing F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, Inc. 344 U.S.
228, 233 (1952); United Feature Syndicate, Inc. v. Sunrise Mold Co., 569 F. Supp.
1475, 1481 (S.D. Fla. 1983)); see also Sara Lee Corp., 36 F. Supp. 2d at 166–67 (look-
ing to Fitzgerald’s factors and explaining copyright damages factors).
88. See Sara Lee Corp., 36 F. Supp. 2d at 170–71 (“Though actual damages,
such as profits and losses, are a typical starting point for analysis, they are difficult
to determine here beyond rough estimates of the amount of counterfeiting.  More-
over, the circumstances make especially salient the various non-monetary factors
based on the defendants’ misconduct.”).
14
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 62, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol62/iss2/2
2017] NOTE 341
Malletier & Oakley, Inc. v. Veit.89  The Eastern District of Pennsylvania em-
phasized the importance of the sales location, which in Louis Vuitton was
the Internet.90  The court focused on the Internet’s role and the need to
deter such counterfeiting activity when calculating damages.91  In addi-
tion, the court awarded $1.5 million in damages because of the defen-
dant’s willful counterfeiting.92
Most recently in 2010, the District of New Jersey took the approach of
adopting copyright law to determine an award of statutory damages in
Coach, Inc. v. Ocean Point Gifts.93  The copyright law approach utilized in
Sara Lee used factors adopted from copyright infringement cases to calcu-
late an award of statutory damages in trademark infringement cases.94
89. 211 F. Supp. 2d 567 (E.D. Pa. 2002), amended (E.D. Pa. June 28, 2002).
90. See id. at 584 (holding defendant’s willful actions led to increase in statu-
tory damages amounting to $1.5 million and highlighting role Internet plays in
counterfeit cases).
91. Id. at 584–85.
This case represents the new era of counterfeiting.  No longer are these
cases limited to the street vendor.  Now, counterfeiters have the internet
as their arsenal.  As found, 143 million Americans use the internet and
represent the counterfeiter’s potential customer base.  While the record
contains no evidence of the actual scope of the defendants’ sales, nor the
number of hits the internet site received, given the scope of the internet
supermarket, such sale offerings are presumptively quite high and pro-
scribed by the Lanham Act.
Id. at 584 (citations omitted) (citing Rolex Watch U.S.A., Inc. v. PRL USA Hold-
ings, Inc., No. 99CIV. 2359(DLC)(FM), 2002 WL 596354, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 17,
2002)).  The Internet provides an almost infinite number of opportunities for
counterfeiters to sell their goods. See Kathy Chu, For Counterfeit Fighters on Social
Media, Fake Profiles Are a Real Ally, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 25, 2016, 10:11 PM), http://
www.wsj.com/articles/for-counterfeit-fighters-on-social-media-fake-profiles-are-a-
real-ally-1461578495 (explaining impact of social media on problematic area of
counterfeit goods).  Counterfeiters can sell goods through registering domain
names and selling the illicit goods on their own websites or registering several
domain names that all link to the original counterfeiter’s website. See id. (explain-
ing ways in which counterfeiters can use Internet to sell goods).  In addition, coun-
terfeiters could sell their goods through social media or on websites such as eBay,
who do not take strong precautions against counterfeiting, but cannot attest to the
quality of the goods being sold or monitor every purchase done through their
website. See generally eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (ex-
plaining that websites such as eBay do not take strong precautions against
counterfeiting).
92. See Veit, 211 F. Supp. 2d at 583–84 (noting court awarded significant
amount of statutory damages to compensate plaintiff and deter defendant from
taking part in counterfeit activities).  The court defined “willful” as “an aura of
indifference to plaintiff’s rights” or a “deliberate and unnecessary duplicating of a
plaintiff’s mark . . . in a way that was calculated to appropriate or otherwise benefit
from the good will the plaintiff had nurtured.”  Id. at 583 (quoting SecuraComm
Consulting Inc. v. Securacom Inc., 166 F.3d 182, 187 (3d Cir. 1999)).
93. Civil Action No. 09-4215 (JBS), 2010 WL 2521444 (D.N.J. June 14, 2010).
94. See id. at *6 (holding defendant committed counterfeiting by selling
goods bearing plaintiff’s marks at its physical store location).  The defendant even
had paper inserts advertising the wallets as part of a new collection and including a
phone number to the real COACH Consumer Service hotline. See id. (explaining
15
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Furthermore, the Coach court discussed the interplay of actual damages,
statutory damages, and the need to relate them to each other.95  The
court then awarded $200,000 in statutory damages compared to the $2
million dollars in damages that were requested.96
D. How to Work Last Season’s Now-Out-of-Style Trends into
All Those Just-Bought Outfits
There are several alternative approaches to calculating statutory dam-
ages that would deter counterfeiters more effectively than current ap-
proaches.97  These alternative approaches are necessary because, even
though monetary and equitable relief is available per the statute, those
remedies have not stopped the counterfeit industry.98  The significant
amount of statutory damages that can be awarded under the statute’s wide
range leads to inconsistent calculations and does not financially deter
counterfeiters or protect the rights of trademark holders.99
One approach is not only to bring suit against the counterfeiters who
supply the illicit goods, but to also bring suit against the purchasers who
have created such a demand for them.100  Without the demand for these
facts of counterfeit COACH items sold).  For a discussion of the copyright-law ap-
proach adopted by the Sara Lee court, see supra notes 84–88 and accompanying
text.
95. See Ocean Point Gifts, 2010 WL 2521444, at *8.  Actual damages are often
challenging to prove and attempting to relate actual and statutory damages based
on the statutory range can lead to even more inconsistency in courts’ calculations
of damages. See also 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (2012) (providing recovery for violation of
rights in trademark cases).
96. See Ocean Points Gifts, 2010 WL 2521444, at *7–8 (describing damages
award); see also Louis Vuitton Malletier & Oakley, Inc. v. Veit, 211 F. Supp. 2d 567,
583–84 (E.D. Pa. 2002), amended (E.D. Pa. June 28, 2002) (“In the absence of
clear guidelines for setting a statutory damage award, courts have tended to use
their wide discretion to compensate plaintiffs, as well as to deter and punish de-
fendants, often borrowing from factors developed in fixing a statutory damage
award for copyright infringement.” (citations omitted) (citing other district court
decisions dealing with counterfeit marks and various damages awarded in each
case)).
97. See infra notes 100–13 and accompanying text (discussing alternative
approaches).
98. See, e.g., Thomas J. Donohue, Counterfeiting and Piracy Briefing: Opening Re-
marks by Thomas J. Donohue President & C.E.O., U.S. Chamber of Commerce Capitol Hill,
U.S. CHAMBER OF COM. (Apr. 5, 2006, 8:00 PM), https://www.uschamber.com/
speech/counterfeiting-and-piracy-briefing [https://perma.cc/AXL7-ZXHE] (not-
ing that about 750,000 jobs are lost each year as result of counterfeit industry).
99. See Sarabia, supra note 9, at 37, 39–40 (explaining goals of current statu-
tory system are not being served and alternative approaches to compensate plain-
tiffs and deter counterfeiting should be examined).
100. See Orscheln, supra note 6, at 263–65 (proposing that legislators allow
civil actions against all players in counterfeiting industry, including purchasers of
such goods).  Without the demand for these goods, counterfeiters would have no
one to whom they could sell and would be financially driven out of business. See id.
at 265–66 (explaining driving force underpinning illicit goods demand).  Instead,
the demand for these goods, especially through Internet sales, has meant little
16
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goods, counterfeiters would have no customers and would be financially
driven out of business.101  A second approach argues for using and en-
hancing current copyright laws to address counterfeiting issues.102  With
this approach, copyright law should be able to protect all fashion designs
and not just the most popular, registered trademarks, as current statutes
dictate.103  A third approach proposes a class system for awarding damages
through specific ranges set for each class of trademarks.104
For a long time, courts have tried to figure out the role the Internet
plays regarding counterfeit goods and the impact that various websites
deterrence for the counterfeit industry because counterfeiters can hide behind the
Internet. See id. at 264 (emphasizing issues Internet has caused fashion designers).
101. See id. at 264–66 (explaining how action against consumers could reduce
demand for counterfeit goods and noting that demand for these goods, especially
on Internet, has benefited counterfeit industry’s reach to consumers). See generally
INT’L TRADEMARK ASS’N, Addressing the Sale of Counterfeits on the Internet, (Sept. 2009),
http://www.inta.org/Advocacy/Documents/INTA%20Best%20Practices%20for%
20Addressing%20the%20Sale%20of%20Counterfeits%20on%20the%20Internet
.pdf [https://perma.cc/A4UZ-JW5F] (explaining international impact of Internet
on counterfeit industry).
102. See, e.g., Tu, supra note 10, at 420, 429–30 (acknowledging that trade-
mark and copyright law should work together to provide most effective protections
and counterfeit deterrence); Kaufman, supra note 2, at 565 (emphasizing trade-
mark law serves public interest by preventing consumer confusion and deception).
103. See Tu, supra note 10, at 424–28, 437 (noting trademark laws generally
provide protection only for well-established, registered trademarks because coun-
terfeiters typically target only famous, well-known, and popular marks to yield
highest demands and profits).  Smaller designers are often not counterfeited but
do face additional intellectual property issues of copyright and trade dress in-
fringement; however, they often do not have adequate financial and legal re-
sources to take action. See id. at 430 (noting litigation to defend designers is
costly); see also Monami Thakur, Leading Fashion Designers Join CFDA-eBay Fight
Against Counterfeits, IBM TIMES (Mar. 22, 2012, 2:48 AM), http://www.ibtimes
.com/leading-fashion-designers-join-cfda-ebay-fight-against-counterfeits-709802
[https://perma.cc/B6A4-9X4K] (explaining how fashion industry has come to-
gether to educate public on counterfeit goods and protect designers).
104. See Sarabia, supra note 9, at 37 (discussing how class system would elimi-
nate need for current statutory system).  Under this approach, each class of trade-
marked goods would have its own monetary range that is more specific to the class
the mark is registered in. See id. at 39 (arguing for class-system approach for statu-
tory damages).  It is argued that the class system is more beneficial because it
would provide for more consistent results by limiting judges’ discretion. See id. at
39–40 (emphasizing system’s benefits).  Such an approach would prompt more
efficient trademark applications, and thus, more consistent court rulings would be
obtained. See id. at 40 (showing benefits class system would have for whole indus-
try).  This approach is most similar to the current statutory system, but more re-
fined because it is based on classes of goods. See id. at 37.  With the current
statutory damage calculations, courts are required to look at the type of goods
being counterfeited in each infringing act. See 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c) (2012) (provid-
ing statutory damages for use of counterfeit marks).  The class system would have
already set a specific range of monetary damages allowed for that class of goods.
See Sarabia, supra note 9, at 37 (explaining class system’s range for monetary dam-
ages allowed in each class).
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have had on this illicit industry.105  In Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc.,106 the
plaintiff, Tiffany & Co., a high-end, reputable jewelry brand, sued eBay for
allowing counterfeit Tiffany jewelry to be sold on its website.107  The court
held eBay was not liable for having generalized knowledge that counterfeit
jewelry was being sold on its website.108  Additionally, the court acknowl-
edged there was no affirmative duty for eBay or other third-party hosting
websites to do something about counterfeit goods being sold.109  This lack
of a duty exists because sellers are using the website as a platform to sell
goods, and eBay neither took possession nor attested to the quality of
these items.110  The decision in Tiffany shows the enhanced difficulty of
applying intellectual property law to counterfeit goods sold on the
Internet.111
III. THE FACTS OF CHANEL, INC. V. MATOS
In Matos, fashion house Chanel brought an action against Rafael
Matos in New Jersey District Court for trademark infringement and coun-
terfeiting.112  Chanel is the owner of several registered trademarks that
105. See Louis Vuitton Malletier & Oakley, Inc. v. Veit, 211 F. Supp. 2d 567,
583–84 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (arguing Internet has played large role in counterfeiting
industry), amended (E.D. Pa. June 28, 2002); see also Coach, Inc. v. Ocean Point
Gifts, Civil Action No. 09-4215(JBS), 2010 WL 2521444, *7–8 (D.N.J. June 14,
2010) (stating role Internet plays in counterfeit cases should be given significant
weight in determining how much to award).
106. 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010).
107. See id. at 95 (holding eBay is not liable for having generalized knowledge
that counterfeit goods were being sold).  eBay lawfully used the Tiffany mark on its
site for advertising. See id. at 103–04.  The court held there was no affirmative duty
requiring eBay to act when counterfeit goods were being sold. See id. at 107 (ex-
plaining holding).  This is because: (1)  eBay never actually took possession of the
items being sold, but rather, acted as a middleman, and (2)  eBay already took
extensive precautions to stop counterfeit goods from being sold through the web-
site. See id. at 97 (explaining reasons for not imposing any additional duty on
eBay).
108. See id. at 103–04 (noting eBay has taken strict precautions to limit coun-
terfeit products being sold on its website as much as it reasonably can); see also
Counterfeit.com, ECONOMIST, July 30, 2015, http://www.economist.com/news/busi-
ness/21660111-makers-expensive-bags-clothes-and-watches-are-fighting-fakery-
courts-battle [https://perma.cc/B9EW-MBVX] (discussing expanded role In-
ternet has had in counterfeit industry).
109. See Tiffany (NJ) Inc., 600 F.3d at 107 (explaining complexities hosting
websites like eBay have added to issue).
110. See id. (noting eBay’s strict measures to combat counterfeits are not one-
hundred percent effective).  Even though all the parties involved in this case ac-
knowledged that eBay had issues with counterfeits being sold, they also noted that
counterfeiting is difficult to police. See id. (explaining difficulty Internet poses for
addressing sale of counterfeit goods).
111. See supra notes 105–10 and accompanying text (explaining difficulty cre-
ated by Internet in addressing issue).
112. See Chanel, Inc. v. Matos, 133 F. Supp. 3d 678, 681 (D.N.J. 2015) (noting
plaintiff also brought false designation of origin claim against defendant).
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represent Chanel’s “quality, reputation, and goodwill.”113  The defendant
was the owner of a website that sold replica Chanel goods.114  The plaintiff
discovered the defendant’s website through a routine investigation for
counterfeit products that the company performs to safeguard the integrity
of the Chanel brand.115  As part of the investigation, the defendant’s web-
site was discovered selling replica Chanel shirts even though the defen-
dant was never authorized to sell any goods bearing Chanel’s marks.116
Further into the investigation, investigators, pretending to be interested
customers, had a phone conversation with the defendant.117  The investi-
gators inquired about some of the “Chanel” goods on sale and the defen-
dant stated the shirts are Chanel-inspired but not authentic.118  Chanel
investigators subsequently ordered “3 chanel blk shirts” for $45 from the
defendant’s website.119
Chanel’s Director of Intellectual Property and Legal Operations then
examined the shirts for authenticity and determined they were counter-
feit.120  Chanel promptly filed suit, claiming the defendant had “know-
ingly, intentionally, and/or blind-fully engaged in activities that” infringed
on Chanel’s registered trademarks without their permission.121  The plain-
113. See id. at 682 (acknowledging Chanel has trademarks registered with U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office).  It is important to note that a trademark does not
need to be registered in order for a trademark owner to bring a civil action against
counterfeiters or infringers of a trademark. See 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2012) (indi-
cating that trademark registration is not necessary to sue counterfeiters).  How-
ever, registering the trademark provides stronger protection. See H.R. REP. NO.
110-617, at 23 (2008) (discussing strength of protection trademark registration
provides).
114. See Matos, 133 F. Supp. 3d at 682 (noting defendant owned domain
rights to website that sold replica designer goods containing plaintiff’s marks).
115. See id. at 682 (stating Chanel conducts investigations as regular business
practice to uphold integrity of brand and marks).
116. See id. at 682–83 (explaining investigation that determined replica Cha-
nel shirts were being sold).
117. See id. at 683 (emphasizing defendant admitted to selling counterfeit
goods by calling them replicas and acknowledging goods were not authentic); see
also Chanel, Inc. v. Gordashevsky, 558 F. Supp. 2d 532, 583 (D.N.J. 2008) (stating
good is “replica” and showed knowledge of trademark).
118. See id. at 683 (emphasizing defendant admitted to selling counterfeit
goods by calling them replicas and acknowledging goods were not authentic); see
also Chanel, Inc. v. Gordashevsky, 558 F. Supp. 2d 532, 583 (D.N.J. 2008) (stating
good is “replica” and showed knowledge of trademark).
119. See Matos, 133 F. Supp. 3d at 683 (highlighting defendant acknowledged
shirts were replicas, which weakened defendant’s argument).
120. See id. (acknowledging defendant sold additional Chanel replica items,
but noting plaintiff chose to investigate specific items central to Matos case).
121. See Matos, 133 F. Supp. 3d at 683 (adding plaintiff filed suit and properly
severed non-responsive defendant).  The defendant’s actions led the court to
enter a default judgment. See id. at 683–84 (explaining reasoning behind default
judgment).  A default judgment was proper because it was the only legal option
available to allow the plaintiff to recover for the defendant’s infringing use of its
marks. See id. at 686; see also supra note 57 and accompanying text (explaining
important role default judgment plays in counterfeit cases).
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tiff asked for sixty times the statutory minimum for monetary damages, but
the court instead awarded thirty times the statutory minimum.122  The
court ultimately awarded $180,000 in statutory damages, ordered perma-
nent injunctive relief barring the defendant from selling any unauthorized
or counterfeit goods using Chanel trademarks, and awarded $400 in filing
fees.123
IV. WHAT LED THE COURT IN CHANEL, INC. V. MATOS TO CHOOSE THE
LATEST STATUTORY DAMAGES APPROACH TO GO
WITH ITS HANDBAG
The court in Matos started its opinion by acknowledging the plaintiff
had met the test for proving trademark infringement.124  This step was
taken because a finding of trademark infringement is required before the
court could determine if counterfeiting occurred.125  The court agreed
with the plaintiff’s argument that the defendant did counterfeit the plain-
tiff’s registered marks at issue.126  Chanel met this criteria by showing that
122. See Matos, 133 F. Supp. 3d at 687–88 (weighing factors adopted in copy-
right law as used in similar counterfeit cases to determine monetary damages); see
also Sara Lee Corp. v. Bags of N.Y., Inc., 36 F. Supp. 2d 161, 166–67 (S.D.N.Y.
1999).  For further discussion of the copyright approach in similar counterfeit
cases, see supra note 15 and accompanying text.
123. See Matos, 133 F. Supp. 3d at 687–88 (stating amount of statutory dam-
ages and costs awarded were within statute’s remedies).
124. See id. at 684–85 (noting that three elements of trademark infringement
were satisfied).  Meeting these elements requires plaintiffs to show they “hold[ ]
and own[ ] valid and legally protectable marks,” own the marks in question, and
the “[d]efendant’s use of [such] Marks will likely cause confusion as to the source,
affiliation, and/or sponsorship of the goods.” See id. (citing Fisons Horticulture,
Inc. v. Vigoro Indus., Inc., 30 F.3d 466, 472 (3d Cir. 1994); Coach, Inc. v. Ocean
Points Gift, No. 09-4215, 2010 WL 2521444, at *2 (D.N.J. June 14, 2010)).  The
plaintiff satisfied these elements. See Matos, 133 F. Supp. 3d at 684–85 (reaching
“inescapable conclusion” that elements have been established).  First, Chanel
showed that it owned trademarks that are registered with the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office. See id. at 685 (“[T]he certificates of registration issued by the
United States Patent and Trademark Office . . . for the Chanel Marks demonstrate,
on their face, the validity and protectability of the Marks, as well as Chanel’s owner-
ship.”).  As a result, the second element was also satisfied. See id.  Third, the defen-
dant’s use of the marks would cause confusion by selling competing unauthentic
goods with Chanel marks on them. See id.  (finding products advertised and dis-
tributed by defendant more than just “confusingly similar” and that they “bear
exact replicas of the protected Chanel Marks”); see also Fisons Horticulture, Inc., 30
F.3d at 472 (discussing likelihood of confusion between two products using similar
marks).
125. See Matos, 133 F. Supp. 3d at 685–88 (noting statutory damages apply
only to counterfeit cases).
126. See id. at 686 (stating defendant’s actions met elements of counterfeit
claim).  First, the plaintiff showed the defendant infringed on a registered trade-
mark under the Lanham Act. See id. at 685 (noting plaintiff proved fact through
federal registration).  Second, the plaintiff showed that the defendant intention-
ally used the marks with knowledge of the mark and that the defendant remained
willfully blind to the status of the mark. See id. at 686–87 (noting Chanel’s investi-
gation showed defendant intentionally used marks).
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it legally owned registered marks and that the defendant acknowledged
selling replica Chanel products.127  The court emphasized that calling the
goods on the defendant’s website “replica” displayed knowledge and will-
ful disregard of the plaintiff’s trademark rights and protections.128
In addition to ruling that counterfeiting was present, the court en-
tered a default judgment.129  The court held that default judgment was
reasonable because the properly-served defendant failed to proffer any de-
fense or refute any of the plaintiff’s claims.130  Default judgment was nec-
essary because it was the only way for Chanel to recover after Matos
refused to provide a defense or take part in the case.131
After determining that Chanel could recover damages for counterfeit-
ing, the court established the type and amount of damages to award.132
Chanel requested a total of $360,000 in statutory damages.133  Instead of
awarding the plaintiff’s requested amount, the court awarded $180,000 in
127. See id. at 686 (noting plaintiff must meet all elements); see also generally
Coach, Inc. v. Ocean Point Gifts, Civil Action No. 09-4215 (JBS), 2010 WL 2521444
(D.N.J. June 14, 2010); Chanel, Inc. v. Gordashevsky, 558 F. Supp. 2d 532, 540
(D.N.J. 2008) (entering default judgment); Louis Vuitton Malletier & Oakley, Inc.
v. Veit, 211 F. Supp. 2d 567, 586 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (ordering same), amended (E.D.
Pa. June 28, 2002).
128. See Matos, 133 F. Supp. 3d at 682–83 (stating defendant’s use of word
“replica” did not favor defendant’s case and instead showed willfulness).  See supra
notes 83 and 116–17 and accompanying text for a discussion of how defendants’
use of the term “replica” can help plaintiffs satisfy the willfulness requirement.
129. See Matos, 133 F. Supp. 3d at 686 (acknowledging significant number of
counterfeit fashion trademark cases end in default judgment, which may be only
proper legal option to compensate plaintiffs in some situations).  See supra note 57
and accompanying text for an explanation of the role of default judgment in coun-
terfeit cases.
130. See Matos, 133 F. Supp. 3d at 686–87 (noting court must consider three
factors when determining if default judgment is proper).  These factors are
whether the defendant has a meritorious defense, whether the defendant would
suffer prejudice as a result of default judgment, and whether the defendant would
be held accountable before entering a default judgment. See id. at 686 (citing
Doug Brady, Inc. v. N.J. Bldg. Laborers Statewide Funds, 250 F.R.D. 171, 177
(D.N.J. 2008)).
131. See id. at 686–87 (finding default judgment proper because plaintiff had
no other way to recover damages under current counterfeit laws).
132. See id. at 687 (examining other courts’ decisions for guidance to deter-
mine damage total when given wide discretion); see also Sara Lee Corp. v. Bags of
N.Y., Inc., 36 F. Supp. 2d 161, 166–67 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
133. See Matos, 133 F. Supp. 3d at 687 (explaining statutory damages were for
two types of goods protected by three registered trademarks).  Chanel “start[ed]
with a baseline [of] . . . $10,000” per good per mark. See id. at 687 (calculating
damages).  This baseline was then multiplied by “two types of goods and three
[infringed] marks” coming to $60,000 per each infringing act. See id. at 688.  Cha-
nel then tripled $60,000 per infringing act to take into account the defendant’s
willful actions, as is allowed under 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c). See id.; see also 15 U.S.C.
§ 1117(c) (2012) (establishing range of damages).  The total of $180,000 was then
doubled for deterrence reasons, resulting in $360,000 of statutory damages. See
Matos, 133 F. Supp. 3d at 687–88 (awarding damages).
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statutory damages and $400 in filing costs.134  The court started its dam-
ages analysis by stating that the amount of statutory damages requested
should bear some relation to the actual damage suffered.135  The court
looked at the copyright factors used in Coach and Sara Lee to determine an
appropriate amount of damages to award, such as the defendant’s inno-
cent or willful conduct and the effect the amount of damages would have
on deterring others besides the defendant.136  After balancing these fac-
tors, the court awarded $30,000 per infringement.137  The court took into
account Matos’s culpability and the need to compensate Chanel for possi-
ble lost profits.138  The court emphasized that the amount awarded should
be significant enough to deter others from engaging in future counterfeit-
ing.139  The court, however, left open the possibility of increasing the
134. See id. at 688–89 (noting awarded amount of $180,400 included $400
awarded for cost of filing suit).  Awarding cost of suit and attorney’s fees is reasona-
ble and proper under § 1117. See id. at 689 (discussing court costs).  Although
attorney’s fees were not discussed in this opinion, they may be awarded under
exceptional circumstances. See 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c) (listing appropriate damages
and costs).  The statute does not define what “exceptional circumstances” means,
but other courts have awarded attorney’s fees in similar counterfeit trademark
cases. See, e.g., Chanel, Inc. v. Gordashevsky, 558 F. Supp. 2d 532, 539 (D.N.J.
2008) (awarding $15,257.50 in attorney’s fees).  For further discussion of the term
“exceptional circumstances,” see supra notes 53 and 74 and accompanying text.
135. See Matos, 133 F. Supp. 3d at 687–88 (“[T]his Court surveyed relevant
Lanham Act cases, and determined that two factors overwhelmingly motivated stat-
utory damage awards: the point of sale of the infringing goods and the monetary
value of the item counterfeited.” (citing Coach, Inc. v. Fashion Paradise, LLC, Civil
No. 10–4888 (JBS/KMW), 2012 WL 194092, at *7 (D.N.J. Jan. 20, 2012))).
136. See id. at 688 (emphasizing court’s wide discretion to calculate damages
and noting usefulness of guidance from past courts); see also Sara Lee Corp., 36 F.
Supp. 2d at 166 (adopting copyright law to trademark counterfeit cases); Coach,
Inc. v. Ocean Point Gifts, Civil Action No. 09-4215 (JBS), 2010 WL 2521444, at
*7–8 (D.N.J. June 14, 2010) (using copyright law as adopted by prior courts).  In
considering factors, past courts and copyright law weigh:
(1) the expenses saved and the profits reaped; (2) the revenues lost by
plaintiff, (3) the value of the copyright; (4) the deterrent effect on others
besides the defendant; (5) whether the defendant’s conduct was inno-
cent or willful; (6) whether [the] defendant has cooperated in providing
particular records to help assess the value of the infringing material pro-
duced; and (7) the potential for discouraging the defendant.
Id. at *7 (citing Platypus Wear, Inc. v. Bad Boy Club, Inc., Civil No. 08-02662
(NLH) (AMD), 2009 WL 2147843, at *7 (D.N.J. July 15, 2009)).
137. See Matos, 133 F. Supp. 3d at 688 (noting Chanel was awarded half of
requested damages).
138. See id. (applying relevant factors to determine proper damage amount).
While mark dilution is a serious consequence of counterfeiting, it is not a factor
that the Matos court, or any other court, weighs when determining an amount of
damages to calculate. See id. at 688 (omitting mark dilution as factor when con-
ducting damages analysis).  This is an overlooked issue that courts need to con-
sider because, it is argued, this has the greatest impact on plaintiffs and the fashion
industry as a result of counterfeiting. See Wakefield & Haack, supra note 59 (dis-
cussing difficulty of proving mark dilution).
139. See Matos, 133 F. Supp. 3d at 688 (citing Platypus Wear, Inc., 2009 WL
2147843, at * 7) (considering “deterrent effect on others besides the defendant”
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damages if the defendant or his associated businesses did not comply with
its ruling.140
In addition to monetary damages, the court awarded a permanent
injunction.141  This form of relief was reasonable per § 1125(c)(5) and
§ 1114 by allowing trademark holders to request injunctive relief.142  The
court found a permanent injunction was proper because it offered the
best remedy to compensate Chanel for a damaged reputation and good-
will in a way that monetary damages could not.143  The court’s opinion
concluded with an order for permanent injunctive relief barring Matos
from using Chanel’s registered trademarks in the future.144
V. WHY TIM GUNN IS BEING CRITICAL OF THAT DESIGN: ANALYZING THE
COURT’S RULING IN CHANEL, INC. V. MATOS
While the ruling in Matos is consistent with past counterfeit cases, the
manner in which the court calculated statutory damages highlights the
issues that come from courts having wide statutory discretion.145  This
but leaving out other factors that should be weighed); see also Counterfeit.com, supra
note 108 (noting Internet has made deterring counterfeiters through litigation
more difficult).  Articles such as that described supra in note 108 are necessary to
educate the public about the illicit industry and hopefully deter purchasers, which
would lessen consumer demand. See id. (discussing economic impact of
counterfeiting).
140. See Matos, 133 F. Supp. 3d at 687–88 (acknowledging court’s strong
stance on deterring counterfeiting).  Injunctive relief does not require a defendant
in a counterfeit goods case to do anything except to follow the law by not engaging
in the sale of the illicit goods. See id. at 689 (enjoining defendant).
141. See id. (emphasizing that injunctive relief plays role in deterrence that
monetary damages cannot).
142. See id. at 689–90 (noting existence of four-factor test to determine if per-
manent injunction is proper equitable relief).  The court weighed “(1) [whether
the plaintiff] has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) [whether] the remedies availa-
ble at law . . . prove inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that the balance
of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant favor equitable relief; and
(4) ‘that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.’”
Id. at 689 (quoting eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006))
(discussing requirements for permanent injunction).  The court determined the
first factor was met because Matos used Chanel’s exact marks, which could lead to
consumer confusion. See id. at 689.  The second factor was met because monetary
damages would not compensate Chanel for reputational and goodwill harm. See
id.  The third factor was satisfied because the only hardship the defendant would
face would be to “abide by the law.” See id. at 690.  The final factor was met be-
cause public interest factors protect the rights of trademark owners’ interests,
prevent consumer confusion, and deter counterfeit activity. See id.; see also
MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. at 392 (explaining injunctive relief elements as
adopted from patent infringement cases).
143. See Matos, 133 F. Supp. 3d at 689 (noting one purpose of injunctive relief
is to ensure defendants follow law).
144. See id. at 690–91 (ordering permanent injunctive relief against defendant
to prevent use of plaintiff’s registered marks in future).
145. See id. at 690 (granting monetary damages, as well as permanent injunc-
tion); see also generally Gucci Am., Inc. v. Gold Ctr. Jewelry, 158 F.3d 631, 634 (2d
Cir. 1998); Coach, Inc. v. Ocean Point Gifts, Civil Action No. 09-4215 (JBS), 2010
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Ssection will discuss the Matos court’s specific damages approach to deter-
mine if it serves the public interest of deterring counterfeiters.146  It will
then examine alternative approaches and question if they are better suited
at addressing the issue of counterfeited trademarks.147
A. Could You Have Added Something Extra to Make That Damages Approach
Start a Trend?
The ruling in Matos is consistent with prior counterfeit cases in that
the court used its discretion to calculate damages as it saw fit.148  Prior
counterfeit cases have taken different approaches to calculating damages,
looking to prior rulings, actual damages, or copyright law, while the Matos
court took the copyright approach but acknowledged the other ap-
proaches courts have taken.149
The court in Matos was very detailed in its explanation of how it calcu-
lated statutory damages and chose to award permanent injunctive relief
against the defendant, but it is unclear if this will be enough to actually
deter counterfeiting.150  The court argued the most important factors
driving the amount of damages in this counterfeit case was the location of
the sale of the counterfeit goods and their monetary value.151  It is ques-
tionable if it is even possible to put a value on a counterfeit good because
counterfeit goods are not authentic.152
WL 2521444, at *1–2 (D.N.J. June 14, 2010); Chanel, Inc. v. Gordashevsky, 558 F.
Supp. 2d 532 (D.N.J. 2008); Louis Vuitton Malletier & Oakley, Inc. v. Veit, 211 F.
Supp. 2d 567, 579 (E.D. Pa. 2002), amended (E.D. Pa. June 28, 2002).
146. See infra notes 160–71 and accompanying text for an explanation of the
problems surrounding judicial discretion.
147. See infra notes 172–84 and accompanying text (discussing lack of current
legal measures to combat counterfeiting industry).
148. See Matos, 133 F. Supp. 3d at 689 (noting plaintiff did not request attor-
ney fees but did request court costs).  Requesting both attorney’s fees and court
costs would have been reasonable under § 1117(c), and both have been awarded
in similar counterfeit cases. See Gordashevsky, 558 F. Supp. 2d at 539 (awarding
attorney’s fees and investigation charges); Veit, 211 F. Supp. 2d at 584 (awarding
$46,504.88 in attorney’s fees); Guess?, Inc. v. Gold Ctr. Jewelry, 997 F. Supp. 409,
411 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (awarding $3,500 in attorney’s fees).
149. See Matos, 133 F. Supp. 3d at 687 (considering prior decisions placing
significant weight on copyright infringement damages factors); see also Gordashev-
sky, 558 F. Supp. 2d at 537–38 (relating statutory damages awarded to actual dam-
ages requested); Veit, 211 F. Supp. 2d at 584 (using court’s own discretion and
putting emphasis on Internet as point of sale); Sara Lee Corp. v. Bags of N.Y., Inc.,
36 F. Supp. 2d 161, 166 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (adopting copyright damages law).
150. See Matos, 133 F. Supp. 3d at 688 (discussing effectiveness of statutory
damages at deterring counterfeiting although industry is still expanding); see also
Lieber, supra note 3 (explaining current state of counterfeits in fashion industry).
151. See Matos, 133 F. Supp. 3d at 688 (noting importance of Internet and
price counterfeit goods were being sold for on defendant’s website).
152. See Orscheln, supra note 6, at 257–58 (noting fashion industry does not
adequately protected designer rights, designs, and trends from each other and
counterfeiters). See also FASHION LAW—A GUIDE FOR DESIGNERS, FASHION EXECU-
TIVES, AND ATTORNEYS 74–76 (Guillermo Jimenez & Barbara Kolsun eds., 2d ed.
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These price and consumer discrepancies highlight how actual dam-
ages can be very ineffective at compensating a fashion house and deter-
ring counterfeiting activity.153  It is difficult, however, to try and relate
statutory damages awarded to actual damages.154  Often poor, if any, re-
cord keeping is done on behalf of the defendant counterfeiter’s busi-
ness.155  Statutory damages were meant to be an alternative when actual
information is unknown, which is why statutory damages are awarded
more often than actual damages in these cases.156  In addition, the same
consumer who buys a counterfeit “Chanel” shirt online for $45 will not be
the same consumer who then walks into a Chanel store to buy a $4,000
handbag.157  Alternative approaches, such as the class system or strength-
2014) (describing arguments for protection of fashion designs and such measures
already being taken in Europe).
153. See Sarabia, supra note 9, at 39 (noting price discrepancies between au-
thentic goods and counterfeit goods, and stating that counterfeit good can lead to
inconsistent statutory damages if courts choose to take actual damages into
account).
154. See id. at 38 (noting difficulty of relating actual damages to statutory dam-
ages considering lack of information provided by defendants to help determine
actual damages). See also Guess?, Inc. v. Gold Ctr. Jewelry, 997 F. Supp. 409, 411
(S.D.N.Y. 1998) (noting court acknowledges lack of records makes it impossible to
establish actual damages accurately).
155. See id. at 38 (highlighting justification for statutory damages).  It is very
problematic to allow courts to have wide discretion to calculate statutory damages
and then have courts try to relate the potential statutory damages to actual dam-
age. See id. (noting judges manipulate price per mark portion of statute to ration-
alize their awards); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (2012) (recognizing difficulty of
calculating and requesting actual damages).  Such actions go against the reasons
statutory damages were created for counterfeit cases. See H.R. REP. NO. 110-617, at
23–25 (2008) (explaining purpose of statute).  The maximum level of statutory
damages that could be awarded were not effectively deterring counterfeiters at
their pre-2008 level. See supra note 47 (discussing changes in statutory damages
maximums).
156. See Sarabia, supra note 9, at 37 (explaining impact statutory damages has
on fashion plaintiffs in counterfeit cases).  Some courts decide to award statutory
damages instead of actual damages. See Chanel, Inc. v. Gordashevsky, 558 F. Supp.
2d 532, 540 (D.N.J. 2008) (awarding full amount requested in statutory damages
instead of actual damages despite plaintiffs’ request for actual damages); see also
Louis Vuitton Malletier & Oakley, Inc. v. Veit, 211 F. Supp. 2d 567, 585–86 (E.D.
Pa. 2002), amended (E.D. Pa. June 28, 2002) (awarding statutory damages where
defendant blatantly used plaintiff’s marks).
157. See Kaufman, supra note 2, at 562–63 (noting price is directly related to
amount of care exercised by purchaser).  In the case central to Kaufman’s article,
Louis Vuitton sued Dooney & Bourke for copying the style of a “white back-
ground” with a “multicolored monogram” pattern on its handbags. See id. at
535–37 (discussing facts of Louis Vuitton Malletier v. Dooney & Bourke, Inc.).  The
court in that case held a plaintiff could not sue for infringement against all others
copying the trend it started. See Louis Vuitton Malletier v. Dooney & Bourke, Inc., 340
F. Supp. 2d 415, 420–21 (2004), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 454 F.3d 108 (2d Cir.
2006); see also Kaufman, supra note 2, at 545 (summarizing holding).  While copy-
ing trends and counterfeiting are very different and legally not considered the
same, it is important to note how they work together as applied to the fashion
industry. See Kaufman, supra note 2, at 537–38 (noting difference “between in-
fringement and acceptable knockoffs”).
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ening intellectual property protections in the fashion industry in general,
would ideally resolve such inconsistencies and decrease the too-wide dis-
cretion Congress has granted courts.158
B. Should Heidi Klum Say, “You’re Out, Auf Wiedersehen” to the Specific
Approach the Matos Court Took?
Even though many courts acknowledge that statutory damages calcu-
lations should have some relation to estimated actual damages, those ac-
tual damages can be easily miscalculated.159  A standard statutory system
that is clear and not a range of millions of dollars left to the court’s discre-
tion is ideal.160
The court in Matos used the copyright law test but reached a different
calculation of damages than other courts using this approach because
each court weighs the factors differently.161  Even with the same few ap-
proaches courts use, courts are generally hesitant to award the same
amount or a higher amount of damages than what Chanel requested.162
This seems inconsistent with the public and legislative intent to award
damages significant enough both to compensate the plaintiff and deter
counterfeiting.163  The Matos court could easily have awarded $2 million
158. See Sarabia, supra note 9, at 40 (noting approach would allow for more
consistently calculated statutory damages); see also Sara Lee Corp. v. Bags of N.Y.,
Inc., 36 F. Supp. 2d 161, 166 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (looking for guidance in other areas
of intellectual property law shortly after § 1117 was enacted); Jimenez & Kolsun,
supra note 152, at 67–69 (explaining recent attempts to strengthen intellectual
property protection for designers in United States).
159. See, e.g., Chanel, Inc. v. Matos, 133 F. Supp. 3d 678, 688 (D.N.J. 2015)
(acknowledging role actual damages play in calculating statutory damages to pre-
vent miscalculations); Gordashevsky, 558 F. Supp. 2d at 537–38 (basing statutory
damages awarded on amount of actual damages plaintiff requested).
160. See Sarabia, supra note 9, at 40 (arguing class-system approach would be
best way to take civil actions against counterfeiters in fashion industry).  Another
approach to statutory damages includes increasing intellectual property rights for
fashion designs through a combination of copyright and trademark law. See Tu,
supra note 10, at 420–21 (stating interplay of copyright law and trademark law
should not be so separate when applied to fashion designs).
161. See Coach, Inc. v. Ocean Point Gifts, Civil Action No. 09-4215 (JBS), 2010
WL 2521444, at *6 (D.N.J. June 14, 2010) (using copyright damages law to deter-
mine $200,000 award despite plaintiffs’ request for $2 million); see also Sara Lee
Corp., 36 F. Supp. 2d at 166 (adopting copyright factors to trademark counterfeits).
162. See generally Matos, 133 F. Supp. 3d at 688 (awarding “thirty times the
minimum statutory damages”); Ocean Point Gifts, 2010 WL 2521444, at *6–8 (weigh-
ing copyright law factors); Gordashevsky, 558 F. Supp. 2d at 537–38 (categorizing
damages as statutory and not actual when awarding exact amount requested).
163. See, e.g., Matos, 133 F. Supp. 3d at 687 (using copyright factors adopted
by prior courts for counterfeit cases); Ocean Point Gifts, 2010 WL 2521444, at *6
(awarding damages by weighing factors adopted from copyright law); Gordashevsky,
558 F. Supp. 2d at 539 (awarding statutory damages based on actual damages re-
quested).  The Eastern District of Pennsylvania explained the reasoning behind
§ 1117 in a 2002 counterfeiting case:
In amending § 1117 to provide for recovery of statutory damages, Con-
gress recognized that “a civil litigant may not be able to prove actual dam-
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per infringing act, the maximum allowable per statutory damages, because
of Matos’s willful actions.164  Instead, the court chose to award $30,000 per
infringing act.165  These significant differences show that the statutory
range is too wide.166  Permanent injunctive relief is a proper form of equi-
table relief but resolves only counterfeiting issues going forward and does
not stop counterfeiting before the goods are sold.167
The defendant in Matos, like most others, did not take part in his
defense, and the case ended in a default judgment.168  It is unclear if Cha-
nel and other similar plaintiffs actually recover the damages awarded
against such defendants.169  Because of the significant public interest in
stopping the counterfeit industry, it would have made sense for the court
ages if a sophisticated, large-scale counterfeiter has hidden or destroyed
information about his counterfeiting.”  It is often the case that counter-
feiters’ records are frequently non-existent, inadequate or deceptively
kept in order to willfully deflate the level of counterfeiting activity actu-
ally engaged in, making proving actual damages in these cases extremely
difficult if not impossible.
Louis Vuitton Malletier & Oakley, Inc. v. Veit, 211 F. Supp. 2d 567, 583 (E.D. Pa.
2002), amended (E.D. Pa. June 28, 2002) (citation omitted).
164. See 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c) (2012) (providing formula for maximum dam-
ages).  For a further discussion of willfulness, see supra notes 48 and 54 and accom-
panying text.
165. See Matos, 133 F. Supp. 3d at 688 (awarding half of plaintiff’s requested
amount).
166. See Sarabia, supra note 9, at 38 (noting courts have broad discretion to
award damages within large statutory range, which can lead to inconsistently-calcu-
lated damages across cases).  This wide monetary range was purposefully built into
the statute so courts could use their discretion as they see fit. See Geoffrey S. Stew-
art, Emerging Issues in Statutory Damages, JONES DAY, (June 2011), http://www.jones
day.com/emerging_issues_in_statutory_damages/ [https://perma.cc/T7PY-YQM
V] (explaining purposefully wide range of statutory damages).
167. See Tu, supra note 10, at 421 (arguing copyright and trademark law are
inadequate to protect original fashion designs).
168. See Matos, 133 F. Supp. 3d at 688 (noting defendant did not participate
in own defense despite being properly served); see also generally Gucci Am., Inc. v.
Gold Ctr. Jewelry, 158 F.3d 631, 635 (2d Cir. 1998) (remanding case for entry of
judgment); Ocean Point Gifts, 2010 WL 2521444, at *10 (entering default judg-
ment); Gordashevsky, 558 F. Supp. 2d at 540 (ordering same); Veit, 211 F. Supp. 2d
at 586.  The issue of default judgments in counterfeit cases is not specific to ones
related to fashion. See Kelcee Griffis, LG Wins $168M Judgment in Counterfeit Headset
Case, LAW 360 (Feb. 8, 2017, 4:01 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/889736/
lg-wins-168m-judgment-in-counterfeit-headset-case [https://perma.cc/6PQB-
DSUV] (ordering default judgment in counterfeit headphone case against seven-
teen companies).
169. See Matos, 133 F. Supp. 3d at 690 (questioning whether current statutory
system deters counterfeiting because plaintiffs often do not recover monetary dam-
ages award).  Currently, fashion designers are raising awareness and publicity sur-
rounding such counterfeit cases because the courts have not provided adequate
remedies to this issue. See Thakur, supra note 103 (fighting counterfeiting with
“You Can’t Fake Fashion” campaign).  These actions educate the public about the
issue of counterfeit goods. See id. (explaining industry-wide efforts undertaken for
public awareness).
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to award the full amount Chanel requested, rather than half.170  The price
of the counterfeit Chanel shirt Matos was selling on his website is not an
accurate consideration in weighing because how can an accurately value
be placed on a counterfeit good?171
VI. WHAT WILL BE IN STYLE NEXT SEASON?
The current statutory approach is out of style and needs to change to
serve the fashion industry better.172  Alternative approaches should con-
cern not only monetary damages, but stronger deterrence options, as
well.173  Counterfeiting lessens integrity and goodwill, and it dilutes trade-
marks by violating valid rights and protections.174
There needs to be one clear approach that gives courts less discretion
and more consistent results.175  Consistently calculated results would bet-
ter serve the public interest of showing counterfeiters exactly what they
can expect when they are sued, which would ultimately deter their illicit
activity.176
New approaches to these types of cases and issues in general need to
be examined and have even been proposed.177  One approach looks to
170. See Sarabia, supra note 9, at 39 (arguing that most effective deterrence
might be achieved by awarding high damage amounts to set tone that courts take
counterfeiting seriously).
171. See Orscheln, supra note 6, at 253–54 (explaining how luxury carries with
it prestige in quality and craftsmanship not found in counterfeit handbags).
172. See infra notes 172–86 and accompanying text (explaining ongoing con-
fusion regarding damages and potential impact of Chanel, Inc. v. Matos).
173. See infra notes 174–80 and accompanying text (showing need for alterna-
tive approaches to create stronger deterrence).
174. See Orscheln, supra note 6, at 258 (discussing why marks are registered
and receive additional protections and benefits under law); see also Kaufman, supra
note 2, at 565 (explaining difficulty of applying intellectual property protections to
fashion cases); Jimenez & Kolsun, supra note 152, at 143–44 (explaining harm
counterfeit goods being sold brings to trademark owners).
175. See H.R. REP. NO. 110-617, at 24–25 (2008) (noting 2008 measures are
ineffective at both deterring counterfeiters and consistently compensating defend-
ants).  However, statutory measures are not currently any better at deterring those
in the counterfeit handbag industry. See infra notes 177–81 and accompanying text
(discussing alternative approaches to current statutory measures).
176. See, e.g., Iris Mansour, How Companies Can Beat the Counterfeiters, FORTUNE
(Aug. 27, 2013), http://fortune.com/2013/08/27/how-companies-can-beat-the-
counterfeiters/ [https://perma.cc/WCC7-9PJX] (explaining that having inconsis-
tent approaches to counterfeit cases fails to address this issue adequately).
177. See Kaufman, supra note 2, at 562 (arguing for better protections of fash-
ion intellectual property by combining different intellectual property rights from
copyright and trademark law).  It is important to discuss the impact that counter-
feit goods have on the industry and on mark dilution. See id. at 543 (suing for
mark dilution could provide some relief but courts are hesitant to apply remedies
for goods that are in competitive classes).  The critical issue of mark dilution is
often ignored in court cases, but it has effects that cannot be measured, such as
customers buying fewer goods from a well-known designer in favor of buying goods
from a brand that is not as commonly known. See id. at 544.
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change the statutory damages system to one based on the class of good
being counterfeited.178  Another approach looks at combining copyright
and trademark protections into one as they apply to the fashion indus-
try.179  Congress should create more inclusive laws to protect all designers
from counterfeiting and not just those with registered or famous trade-
marks.180  Some argue that anti-counterfeiting laws should additionally
target purchasers of these goods, not just sellers, so that all players in this
industry are susceptible to legal action.181
It is also important to note that current laws address counterfeit
goods only in cases where trademarks are famous or registered.182  This is
because small designers who do not have the means of internationally fa-
178. See Sarabia, supra note 9, at 40 (arguing for class-system approach to
counterfeiting to provide more consistently calculated damages and stronger de-
terrence to counterfeiting).  This system would base the amount of damages to be
awarded on the class the good is categorized as such as a handbag, women’s shirt,
or sunglasses. See id.  A similar class system approach is utilized when determining
duties on imported goods. See Jimenez & Kolsun, supra note 152, at 304–06 (ex-
plaining how classifications for imports work).
179. See Tu, supra note 10, at 425–26 (noting courts have used interplay of
copyright and trademark law by adopting copyright damages law to counterfeit
trademark cases); see also Sara Lee Corp. v. Bags of N.Y., Inc., 36 F. Supp. 2d 161,
166 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (using copyright law in trademark counterfeit case).  The Su-
preme Court’s ruling in Star Athletica, LLC v. Varsity Brands, Inc., has clarified the
test for copyright protection of useful articles. See Supreme Court Sounds off on Copy-
right in Cheerleading Uniform, FASHION L. (Mar. 22, 2017) http://www.thefashionlaw
.com/home/supreme-court-says-cheerleader-uniform-is-protectable-by-copyright-
law?rq=Varsity%20Brands%2C%20Inc [https://perma.cc/H8NK-EA8C] (explain-
ing Supreme Court’s ruling).  Useful articles include such items as shirts and
dresses. See id.  This prevailing test for copyright protection of useful articles will
have an impact on fashion designs and whether specific designs are able to receive
protection. See id.  While Varsity Brands does not address counterfeiting, it is a step
in the direction of applying more intellectual property protections to the fashion
industry. See generally Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., No. 15-866, 2017
WL 1066261 (U.S. Mar. 22, 2017) (setting forth prevailing test for copyright pro-
tection on useful articles).
180. See Tu, supra note 10, at 422 (discussing exclusive nature current laws
have on fashion industry as whole because famous designers receive more financial
benefits).
181. See Orscheln, supra note 6, at 264 (noting counterfeit sellers are not
solely responsible for counterfeit industry’s continuing success).
182. See Tu, supra note 10, at 425 (arguing for more inclusive laws for all de-
signers); see also Sarabia, supra note 9, at 36–38 (encouraging designers to register
their marks to promote consistent compensation to plaintiffs and deter counter-
feiting).  This non-inclusiveness of all designers is because counterfeiters typically
counterfeit only goods that have wide spread popularity and demand such as Cha-
nel, Hermes, and Louis Vuitton. See The World’s Most Counterfeited Brands, MSN,
(Dec. 24, 2016), https://www.msn.com/en-us/money/companies/the-worlds-
most-counterfeited-brands/ss-BBsVVXu#image=1 [https://perma.cc/PN2M-
NJ2B] (discussing most counterfeited brands in 2016).  Smaller, less well-known
fashion designers do deal with intellectual property infringement issues from those
same counterfeited famous designers without the range of resources famous de-
signers have to fight these issues. See Chanel Accused of Copying Looks in Me´tiers d’Art
Collection, FASHION L. (Dec. 6, 2015), http://www.thefashionlaw.com/home/cha-
nel-accused-of-copying-looks-in-metiers-dart-collection [https://perma.cc/6347-
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mous fashion houses are unable to bring suit against those infringing on
their designs and trademarks.183  While counterfeiting primarily affects fa-
mous marks, the fashion industry in general has a massive intellectual
property problem because there are minimal protections that apply to all
designers and their designs equally.184
Counterfeiting trademarks is just one aspect of the industry that des-
perately needs a reassessment of intellectual property protections and
rights.185  Deterring counterfeiters and finally putting a stop to this illicit
industry are necessary to protect the goodwill and integrity of the fashion
holders of trademarks.186  The statutory damages system, as emphasized in
Matos, shows that this trend is no longer in style and needs to be retired to
the back of the closet.
WU7Z] (reporting on Chanel copying lesser-known designer in major runway
collection).
183. See Sarabia, supra note 9, at 36–38 (noting that closely-held companies
are more vulnerable).  Because these smaller designers do not have the abundant
resources of such internationally famous fashion houses, they often take to social
media to seek justice for their intellectual property rights. See Chanel Accused of
Copying Looks in Me´tiers d’Art Collection, supra note 182 (using Facebook to publicize
Chanel’s copying of lesser known designer); Zara Comes Under Fire for Copying Indie
Artists Designs, FASHION L. (July 20, 2016), http://www.thefashionlaw.com/home/
zara-comes-under-fire-for-copying-indie-artists-designs?rq=zara%20copying [https:/
/perma.cc/NQ6V-NVY5] (describing copying of design by indie artist who subse-
quently took to Twitter to publicize Zara’s actions).
184. See Kaufman, supra note 2, at 531, 541, 565–66 (noting inconsistent intel-
lectual property protections); see also eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S.
388, 392 (2006) (arguing patent infringement injunctive relief could be analo-
gously applied to counterfeit trademark cases); see also Sara Lee Corp., 36 F. Supp.
2d at 166 (applying copyright infringement law to counterfeit trademark case to
determine statutory damages).
185. See Kaufman, supra note 2, at 541, 565–66 (noting that even designers are
guilty of copying other designers, which represents just one problem resulting
from lack of intellectual property protections applied to fashion industry).
186. See Sarabia, supra note 9, at 38 (emphasizing importance that legal action
be taken to address counterfeiting industry); see also Chanel, Inc. v. Matos, 133 F.
Supp. 3d 678, 689 (D.N.J. 2015) (acknowledging need for deterrence); Sara Lee
Corp., 36 F. Supp. 2d at 166 (emphasizing need for guidance on how to handle
these cases to deter counterfeiters); Kaufman, supra note 2, at 541, 565–66 (noting
challenge of applying intellectual property law generally to fashion industry).
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